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Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law
Claire Finkelsteint

I. INTRODUCTION

What do criminal laws prohibit? A series of immoral
or harmful acts? Or does the law also seek to prohibit
performing those acts for certain reasons, acting on certain
motives, or acting on the basis of certain character traits?
In short, does the law look only at the quality of the act the
defendant performs?
Or does it look more broadly at
whether the person who performed the prohibited act was
righteous or ignoble, well-meaning or malign?
The traditional view says that the criminal law focuses
uniquely on acts. According to that view, character and
motive are irrelevant to criminal liability.1 They are not
relevant to the actus reus, since they merely serve to
identify the prohibited conduct.2 And they are not relevant
t Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. My thanks
to Kim Ferzan, Leo Katz, and Peter Westen for comments on various drafts and
discussions on the topic of this article.
1. See H.L.A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968); R.A. Duff, Virtue,
Vice and Criminal Liability: Do We Want An Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 147 (2002); Benjamin Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and
Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethica &: Pub. Pol'y 99
(1996); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character and Criminal Liability, 12 Law &: Phil. 345
(1993); Michael S. MooTe, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 Soc. Phil. &: Pol'y 29

(1990).

2. Motive is occasionally relevant for establishing the special mental state
required for crimes of specific intent, as it is in bias crimes or crimes that
separately criminalize killing for hire or for sexual pleasure. But even the
ordinary specific intent crimes, such as burglary, which requires the "intent to
commit a crime," Model Penal Code§ 221.1 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), or
forgery, which requires a "purpose to defraud or injure," id. § 224.1(1), do not
actually criminalize motive, though they might appear to do so. The mens rea in
these cases does not so much go to the question of why the defendant entered a
building or altered a writing, as it goes to the furtl�r intention with which he did
it. The motive for such crimes, such as money, revenge, or hatred, are nowhere
part of the offense definition.
German law, by contrast, explicitly treats crimes done from different
motives as different crimes. For example, the StGB defines murder in terms of its
motive, namely as killing for sheer pleasure, to satisfY a sexual impulse, or on
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to the mens rea, since the mental state requirement serves
only to ensure that the defendant is responsible for what he
did or for the state of affairs he brought about.3 The
traditionalist will of course allow that there are instances
in which character or motive can affect a defendant's
ultimate fate. A motive like self-defense or necessity will
entitle a defendant to a justification defense. And a person
who has manifested a good character throughout his life
will usually receive a shorter sentence than a defendant
who has manifested a bad one. But these examples are not
inconsistent with the traditional view, which maintains
that notions like character and motive are irrelevant for
prima facie judgments of criminal responsibility.
In recent years, a number of writers have challenged
the received wisdom. 4 Inspired at least in part by a revival
of virtue ethics in the philosophical literature,5 the
"character theorists" begin with the Aristotelian thesis that
human beings create their own character traits by
repeatedly performing acts of the sort that display that
trait.
Thus a person acquires the trait of bravery by
performing frequent brave acts, and a person acquires the
trait of liberality by spending money freely. According to
the character theorists, punishing agents for bad acts they
perform is a way of punishing them for the bad characters

account of greed or other "base motives." But ordinary intentional killing, not
done from one of theRe motive.��, is not murder, §§ 211 & 212 StGB,
3. A person does not lack the mens rea for murder, for example, because he
ki!!ed for the pu� of putting li terminaJ!y iJ! patient OUt of hill misery, OJ' even
because he killed in self-defense. That is, justifications like self-defense and
necessity do not "negative" the mens rea for the offense. A person who kills in
self-defense kills intentionally, and so satisfies the mens rea for murder. This is
in contrast to excuses like mistake, which negative the mens rea for the crime
they exonerate.
4. See Victor Tadros, The Characters of Excuse, 21 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 495
{2001); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423 (1995);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 575 (1998); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, 7
Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 59 (1990).
5. See Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81
Phil. Rev. 305 (1972).
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that produced those acts, and of encouraging the
development of good character traits in the future.
The debate between the traditionalists-the so-called
"choice theorists"-and the character theorists has
particularly come to the fore in writings about the criminal
defenses. Because choice theorists see human beings as
responsible for the freely chosen conduct in which they
engage, choice theorists are inclined to understand
criminal defenses as falling into one of two categories:
Action which is chosen but justified by considerations of
social welfare, and action which is excused because not
fully chosen.6 But character theory has allowed for an
If
interesting and different position on the defenses.
criminal liability is based on the bad character or motive of
the person who intentionally violates a prohibitory norm, a
defendant might at least be entitled to an excuse where his
bad act does not in fact support an inference from the
quality of the act to the quality of the underlying character
trait.7 Because we cannot draw the conclusions about the
defendant's character we supposedly do in cases of
unexcused wrongdoing,
the rationale for inflicting
punishment does not obtain.8
A variation on this general theme suggests that the
criminal law is primarily concerned with punishing
defendants who manifest a defect of motivation, and that
we should excuse those who violate the law in cases where
no defect of motivation exists.9
Like the claim about

6. An altem!ltive approach t{! justifi!:ation in the choite theory literature 2ees
justified acts as issuing from moral rights people have. A:s I explain below,
however, the rights version of justification does not fundamentally change the
structure of the choice theory, and in particular, does not eliminate its drawbacks.
See infra text accompanying notes 34.
7. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law§ 10.3.1 (1978); Huigens, supra
note4.
8. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame (1997); Stephen Garvey, "As the Gentle
Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1024
(1996) (referring to what he calls the "character-will theory"); Michael Corrado,
Notes on the Structure of A Theory of Excuses, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 465
(1992).
9. See Richard B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal
Law, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal Justice 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
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character, the suggestion about motive is that we cannot
draw any negative conclusions about the motives of a
person whose reason for violating the law is that he fears
for his life or for the life of a loved one.
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the debate
between the choice and the. character theorists. Much has
already been written on that debate, and I have little of
substance to add to it. Instead, my purpose is to return to
a project I began in previous writings, namely to
understand the structure of a certain class of defenses I call
"rational excuses."10 Defenses in this category straddle the
line between traditional excuses and justifications. They
are cases, I claim, where the agent acts on the basis of
deliberation, and so controis her behavior. But I call them
"excuses," rather than justifications, because they are also
cases where the agent acts for personal reasons, rather
than for the impersonal considerations of social welfare.
My suggestion will be that neither the choice theory nor the
character theory is particularly well-suited to account for
the rational excuses. In particular, I shall argue that while
choice theorists are more nearly correct about the general
structure of criminal responsibility, they do not have a
plausible theory of exculpation.
And while character
theorists are right to suggest that states of character and
dispositions should be taken into account in criminal
liability, the theory does not do so in the right way. The
rational excuses thus reveal the need for a different theory
of exculpation than either the choice or the character
theory provides.
In what follows, I shall suggest that the rational
excuses exonerate because they are cases in which the
agent acts on the basis of what I shall call an "adaptive
disposition," namely a disposition that enhances the
welfare of the agent who cultivates it and makes possible

Chapman eds., 1985), rpt. in Richard B. Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism, and
Rights (1992).
10. See Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. Pitt. L.

Rev.

621 (1996); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the

Defense in Law, 37

Ariz. L. Rev. 252 (1995).
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collective welfare improvements. The law is interested in
promoting and rewarding such dispositions, because there
will be mutual gains from their adoption if members of
society generally possess them. It will thus tuni out to be
possible to vindicate the legal rules establishing the class of
defenses I am calling rational excuses in contractarian
terms, since a rational agent would agree to a legal rule
that leaves him better off than he would be in its absence.
My argument will proceed as follows. In the next Part,
I review the basic elements of the choice and character
theories, along with the account of the defenses implied by
each. In Part III, I lay out the structure of the rational
excuses, and I explain why the choice theory is ill-equipped
to account for defenses in this category. In Part IV, I do the
same for the character theory. I argue that that theory is
both problematic in its own right and unable to account for
the rational excuses. In Part V, I present my alternative
account of the rational excuses. I explain why the rational
excuses require a disposition-based account. In Part VI I
conclude by explaining why the fact that the relevant
dispositions are adaptive allows us to justify the rules
governing the rational excuses in contractarian terms.
II. CHOICE AND CHARACTER
The choice theory of criminal responsibility predicates
responsibility on the individual choice the defendant makes
to violate a prohibitory norm. The choice theory thus
naturally focuses on '-u�tions; rather than on states of
character, and on whether those actions conform to an
objective standard of conduct. As Peter Arenella explains
the theory, "When ... an actor makes a rational choice to
engage in conduct that breaches the governing norm, he
deserves moral blame because he could have chosen to
comply with it."11 On other versions of the account, what is
relevant is the moral worth of the choice the agent makes.
As R.A. Duff writes, "We might dislike or regret other

11. Arenella, supra note 4, at 59.
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aspects of a person's character, but only his will is a proper
object of moral criticism. "12 It is consistent with this view
to treat each criminal act as a separate object of evaluation.
The choice theory has no interest in a pattern of choices an
individual might have made in the past, nor in an overall
trait that might lead her to make such choices in the
future. For this reason, the choice theory has no use for
observations about the relation between the prohibited
action and the defendant's character.
The authoritative statement of the choice theory is
H.L.A. Hart's in Punishment and Responsibility. On the
conception of responsibility for which Hart argues, the
crucial questions, both for moral and legal responsibility,
are about "the character or extent of a man's control over
his own conduct, or . . . the causal or other connexion
between his action and harmful occurrences, or . . . his
relationship with the person who actually did the harm. "13
The basic element of control must also be combined with a
set of background capacities to obey the law, as well as
with external circumstances that allow the agent to
exercise those capacities: "What is crucial is that those
whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the
normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the
law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair
opportunity to exercise those capacities."14
When the
background capacities are satisfied, and the external
circumstances provide individuals with an opportunity to
obey the law, the choice to perform an (unjustified) act that
violates the law is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition for criminal liability.
The choice theory is usually combined with a welfare
based standard for evaluating the content of an agent's
choices. Thus an agent will be blamed for his decision to
violate the criminal law, unless he can justify his choice by
its positive effects on social welfare. Such justifications
apply to instances in which, although the defendant's act
12. Duff, Choice, Character and Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 346.
13. Hart, supra note 1, at 225.
14. Id. at 152.
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falls within the ambit of the prohibitory norm the law
defines, the law is otherwise committed to promoting the
defendant's conduct. A person who must burn a field in
order to create a firebreak to save a town from destruction
by forest fire would have a defense to the crime of
intentionally destroying the property of another, because
the overwhelming social importance of saving the town
justifies the legal infraction. For those criminal acts that
do not merit punishment, but where reasons of social
utility are unavailing, the choice theory can only explain
the defendant's exoneration if it is able to deny that the
agent actually chose to violate the prohibitory norm.
Where the agent was mistaken, acted accidentally, or
moved his body involuntarily, we cannot regard him as
having chosen to violate the law, and thus we do not hold
him responsible for his conduct. Lack of capacity in the
criminal law thus functions as an excusing condition much
in the way that a denial of capacity will serve to invalidate
a contract: Just as a person cannot be understood to have
truly agreed to the terms of a contract if he was insane,
infantile, intoxicated, mistaken, coerced, etc., so these same
conditions will defeat the presumption that an agent who
violated a criminal prohibition was responsible for violating
the law. In this way, the choice theory gives rise to what is
sometimes called the "capacity'' theory of the excuses,
meaning that it accounts for the excuses in terms of a
diminished capacity on the agent's part to conform her
behavior to the law.16
The association between Hart's choice theory of
responsibility and the capacity theory of the excuses has
become a standard part of commentary and black letter
law.
Paul Robinson, in his treatise on the defenses,
explains that all excuses are characterized by the fact that
they have a "disability requirement."18 He writes: "The
disability requirement is the actor's abnormal condition at
the time of the offense . . . . It may be a long-term or even

15. See Tadros, supra note 4, at 495.
16. 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 161 (1984).
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permanent condition, such as subnormality, or it may be a
temporary state, such as intoxication, somnambulism,
automatism, or hypnotism. Its cause may be internal, as in
insanity, or external, as in duress."17 A defendant will
normally have a defense, Robinson suggests, when his
disability causes him to act in a way that is not the product
of his voluntary effort or determination, to mistake the
physical nature or consequences of his conduct, to mistake
the wrongfulness or criminality of his behavior, or to be
unable to control his conduct. If, on the other hand, the
defendant chose to violate a criminal prohibition, while he
was in control of his conduct and without legal justification,
he is responsible for the violation and will be called to
account for it.
Those who take a character-based approach to
criminal liability, by contrast, regard the focus on the
defendant's choice as an overly narrow basis on which to
assess the merits of his conduct. Instead, they argue,
criminal acts are punishable only insofar as they stem from
By
established features of an agent's character.
"character," these theorists have in mind roughly the
Aristotelian concept of fixed or stable aspects of an agent's
psychological make-up that pertain to virtues and vices.
Unlike their counterparts in moral theory, however, the
character theorists in criminal law need not hold a virtue
theory of moral responsibility. The relevance of character
to criminal liability has been claimed both by those who
hold a retributivist theory of punishment, and by those who
espouse the corresponding utilitarian view .18
The
suggestion of the former (what we might c all "character
retributivists") is that an actor's desert for punishment is
17. Id.at222.

18. As Michael Corrado explains:

A character theory . . . does not have to be a utilitarian theory.

A

retributive theory of excuses . . . might assert that desert is the only
appropriate

basis

for

punishment.

Only

bad

character

deserves

punishment, on such a theory, and we excuse cases in which the agent

could not have done otherwise because the inability to do otherwise

prevents the inference from the illegal act to the bad character.
Corrado, supra note 8, at 470.
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based on conclusions his act allows us to draw about the
bad state of his character. George Fletcher, for example,
argues that "[a]n inference from the wrongful act to the
actor's character is essential to a retributive theory of
The claim of the latter ("character
punishment. "19
utilitarians") is that the criminal act allows for an inference
to bad motivation or character, and that a system of
punishment that penalizes on the basis of such features
will maximize social welfare.20
The integration of character into either a retributive or
a utilitarian theory of punishment produces a character
based theory of the excuses: If punishment is for bad states
of character, then an excuse is warranted when an agent
who has violated a criminal norm does not manifest the
character defect we would normally infer from the act he
performs. Thus a character retributivist would claim that
a defendant who robs a bank under duress does not deserve
to be punished. As Fletcher writes, "[IJf a bank teller opens
a safe and turns money over to a stranger, we can infer
that he is dishonest. But if he does all this at gunpoint, we
cannot infer anything one way or the other about his
honesty."21 A character utilitarian would say that there is
utility only in punishing people who manifest bad
character.22
On Richard Brandt's version of character
utilitarianism, the thesis is spelled out in terms of
motivation, rather than character.23 On this view, the
purpose of the criminal law is to punish for defects of
motivation; a worse defect of tnotivation should entail a
more severe punishment.24 The attending theory of the

19. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 800.
20. Brandt, supra note 9.
21. Fletcher, supra note 7, at800.
22. See Paul H. RobinSQn & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 453-499 (1997).
23. Brandt himself seems to think the two equivalent, since he thinks of
character as a "system of motivations." Brandt, supra note 9, at 171.
24. Brandt writes: "if a worse defect of motivation is shown by intentional
homicide than by reckless homicide, one might infer that the punishment for
murder should be more severe than for manslaughter." Brandt, supra note 9, at
170.
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excuses would exempt an agent who commits an illegal act
when that person did not manifest a defect of motivation:
"a legally wrongful act ought to be subject to punishment
only if the act manifested a defect of motivation."25
The difference between the character and the choice
theory can be captured in terms of two kinds of evaluations
or judgments a person might make.26 On the one hand,
there is evaluation of a person in light of somethi�g he did,
where we evaluate the person's action in isolation from
facts about him that might explain why he behaved as he
did. This form of evaluation is focused on action because it
is concerned with whether the agent's behavior conformed
to an external norm of permissibility. On the other hand,
there is evaluation of an agent as a person, taken as a
whole, where we are not particularly interested in whether
his behavior conforms to a norm, but in whether he is a
good or bad person, considered in a more general sort of
way. The choice theorists think of criminal responsibility
as a form of the first kind of evaluation, whereas the
character theorists appear to think of it as a form of the
second kind.
While I am not prepared to defend the choice theorist's
approach to criminal liability across the board, I do believe
it has this over the character theory: the character theory
appears to efface the distinction between the two kinds of
evaluation outlined above.
It confuses criminal
responsibility with the kind of judgment that might
interest a priest, a psychotherapist, or a governor deciding
whether to grant clemency. The governor, for example, is
truly concerned with the state of the criminal's soul. He
wishes to know whether a terrible deed the criminal has
performed is out of keeping with his overall moral worth,
and so whether the criminal is a fitting object for an
exercise of mercy. In order to decide whether the deed is in
fact representative of the criminal as a person, the
25. Id.
26. For a slightly more extended discussion of the distinction, see Claire

Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Reply to
Moore, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 335, 342-344 (1996).
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governor wants to know what motivated the conduct, and
whether the criminal has performed similar acts in the
past. He is also interested in facts that have nothing to do
with the wrongful act itself, such as whether the criminal
would be a productive member of his community if
returned to normal life, and whether others in society
would benefit or be harmed by his release. Unlike a judge
or members of a jury who are concerned with guilt or
innocence, the governor's interest in the criminal's act is
limited to the evidence it provides of that person's internal
moral worth and of his future dangerousness. He has no
more reason to be interested in what the criminal did on
this occasion than he would be in any other manifestation
of character or motivation. 27
Despite the fact that the choice theory seems to better
capture the basic form of evaluation in criminal law, it
faces some important difficulties. In the next Part we will
focus on the rational excuses, for it is here that the choice
theory's shortcomings are most apparent. We will see first,
that it is difficult to make sense of the rational excuses in
the absence of the notion of a disposition, and second, that
the choice theory's difficulty explaining responsibility for
acts that arise "habitually" is what makes it unsuited to
account for this class of defenses.

27. Michael Corrado argues that the choice and character theories reduce to
the same thing. The character theory claims that it is unfair to hold agents liable
for acts that are out of character, but fair to hold them for acts in which their

aettled dispositions

are expressed. And as he understands the choice theory, it
maintains that it is unfair to hold agents liable for actions caused or constrained

by external forces, and fair to hold them for actions they themselves author.
Since action that arises from a disposition or character trait is "internally"
produced, he thinks both theories would hold agents responsible for bad acts that
stem from the bad character traits they author. Michael Corrado, supra note 8, at
479-80. I think, however, that Corrado misunderstands the choice theory in this
context. An action that stems from a disposition is not separately willed in the

sense the choice theorists have in mind, since it is not chosen in its own right.
Rather, an action that stems from a character trait is a non-optional result of the
earlier choice or choices that led to the development of the character trait in the
first place. So although actions that stem from a disposition may be determined
by something "inside" the agent, they
theorist requires.

are

not chosen in the way the choice
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III. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND THE CHOICE THEORY

Consider the following instances where a defendant
might claim partial or total exoneration. There is the case
of the two sailors who are survivors of a shipwreck, trying
to stay afloat by clinging to a plank in the water. The
plank is strong enough to support only one, and the
defendant saves his own life by pushing his fellow off it.
There is the case of the person who commits a criminal act
upon demand, after being threatened with the death of his
loved ones by members of a criminal organization. There is
the person who throws a hand grenade at a mob of young
children who are wielding deadly weapons, where he
believes this is the only way he can save his life. Or the
case of the person enticed by a police officer into buying
drugs, where the officer exerts intense pressure to induce
the defendant to make the purchase. Finally, there is the
person who meets his loved one's rapist unexpectedly, and
attacks him in revenge, or the man who comes home to find
his wife in bed with another man, and in a fit of rage,
shoots them both dead.
My suggestion is that the above cases have a common
structure, despite their historically different treatment in
the law. On the one hand, they are all cases in which the
defendant can be held to account for his conduct, since he is
fully in control of the criminal act. Indeed, there is a firmer
basis for ascribing responsibility in such cases than control,
since the defendant even performs the prohibited act
intentionally, and not as a mere side effect of his behavior.
But they are a1so cases in which the conduct is not justified
by considerations of the greater social good. That is, the
defendant cannot vindicate his conduct by claiming that he
does more good than harm. Indeed, his reason for doing
what he does in such cases is always personal. The value
he perceives in the criminal act stems from the fact that it
advances his interests or the interests of someone he cares
about. Defenses of the above sort thus appear to hover
between justifications and excuses, at least as these
categories have been traditionally conceived.
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What does the choice theorist do, then, when faced
with these examples? The answer is that he squeezes them
into the surrounding categories of social benefit, on the one
hand, and diminished capacity, on the other, calling the
first set of defenses "justifications" and the second set
"excuses." The case of the men clinging to the plank, for
example, might be treated as an instance of the
justification of necessity, and the person who kills the
children with the hand grenade could claim the
justification of self-defense. The traditional account would
explain this by assimilating such cases to more clear-cut
examples of necessity and self-defense: the person who
bums down a field to create a firebreak in order to prevent
a town from being engulfed by flames; the person who
attacks a malicious attacker in order to save himself from a
lethal attack. On the other hand, the choice theorist would
probably treat the person coerced into assisting in the
performance of the criminal act and the person pressured
into purchasing drugs as excused, according them the
defenses of duress and entrapment respectively.
The
person who meets his loved one's assailant is thought
entitled only to the partial excuse of extreme emotional
disturbance or provocation.28 These cases are treated as
excuses by assimilating them to cases in which the
defendant's conduct is involuntary or otherwise lacking in
control.
The Model Penal Code embodies the capacity
theory perspective when it requires that the coercion be
such "that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
would have been unable to resist. "'Zs Robinson, for example,
writes that "the excusing condition in duress ia the
impairment of the actor's ability to control his conduct. ttao
And he argues that entrapment is like the duress defense,

28. Under the traditional rules governing the provocation defense, merely
encountering a loved one's assailant would be insufficient to generate a defense.
The defendant must actually have witnessed the assault immediately prior to his
own response. See, e.g., State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272 (Ohio 1992) (rejecting
claim of provocation for defendant who leamed verbally of 6ancoo's infidelity).

29. Model Penal Code§ 2.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30. 2 Robinson, supra note 16, § 177 (b)(l), at 351.
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insofar as it is based on the idea that "the defendant's
actions were not fully his own. "3l The choice theorist would
see the person who merits a provocation defense as
someone who lacks the capacity to restrain his emotions.
He would prefer the psychological formulation of the
defense to the traditional normative formulation.
One
would thus expect him to side with the Model Penal Code's
extreme emotional disturbance formulation over the
traditional provocation or "heat of passion, approach.32
Evidence that something is amiss with the choice
theory's approach, however, comes with the first group of
examples we considered, the cases that would traditionally
be called justifications. The problem with treating the
plank case and the defense-against-children case as
justifications is that they are all instances in which the
criminal act is not particularly redeemed by considerations
of social welfare. Is it truly better, from the standpoint of
social utility, that one stranded sailor survive rather than
another?
The problem is that where each person is
concerned, it is not better for the world that he survive, and
so we cannot say, as between the two, which one would be
entitled to push the other off the plank. That is, if the
entitlement a person sometimes has to violate the law is
based on the social utility of his doing so, then arguably we
do not have a reason in a case like the plank case for siding
with one man clinging to the plank over the other. And so
we do not have a basis for finding one man justified in
pushing the other off, that would not also lead us to
conclude that the second man is justified in pushing the
first man off.
Admittedly, it is better that one stranded sailor
survive than that none survive, and from this perspective
the law ought to encourage someone to push someone else

31. Id. § 209 (b), at 513.

He does allow, however, that there is a different

theory of the defense, based on the idea that it is a defense designed to deter
improper police conduct.
82. Cf. the "extreme emotional disturbance" defense of the Model Penal Code,
§ 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and a traditional "heat of passion defense,"
such as Cal. Pen. Code § 192(a) (West 2002).
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off. Why not say, then, that each is justified in pushing the
other off the plank, since society would be better off if either
one did so? Since the best social rule would probably allow
each to try to push the other o!).e off, what impediment
would there be to allowing the victor in such a contest to
claim the benefit of justification once he succeeds? The
problem with this solution has to do with the traditional
approach to justification. According to the traditional logic,
if A is justified in pushing B off the plank, it would follow
That is, the
that B is not justified in resisting A.
traditional approach denies that each of two individuals
can be simultaneously justified, if the actions they perform
entitle each to oppose the other. From this it follows that
neither man clinging to the plank could be justified, despite
the fact that it might be socially beneficial if one were to
push the other off.33
One might, however, suppose such difficulties peculiar
to the plank case, where the claimed entitlements over a
common resource are exactly symmetrical. And if this were
the case, we need not worry, since where cases of conflicting
claims of justification are concerned, precise symmetry is
rare. But in fact the problem is common to all cases in the
in between category of defenses we are considering. Notice,
for example, that we cannot explain the entitlement of the
defendant to use lethal self-defense against the children in
terms of social utility, since it is not particularly welfare
maximizing for a large number of innocent children to die
instead of for a single person attacked by those children to
die. Indeed, from the standpoint of social utility, we should
favor the children's lives over the victim's, since the former
are more numerous. If the theorist is going t.o treat all self
defense cases as instances of justification, then, he will have
to conclude that a person is not entitled to defend himself
against a mob of infantile aggressors, and that is surely the
wrong result.

33. For a further discussion of this case, see Claire Finkelstein, Two Men and
a Plank, 7 Legal Theory 279 (2001).
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On the social welfare approach to justification, that an
act would increase the level of social utility provides a basis
for allocating legal rights. But in the face of the argument
just given, one might want to reject the social welfare view
of justification, and argue that the legal rights that
constitute justifications are identified by an underlying
theory of moral rights instead. On this alternate view of
justification, it would not be necessary for the prohibited
act to be welfare�ma.ximizing in order for it to be legally
justified. We would say that the person who violates the
law in such cases is justified, because he is defending an
antecedent moral right he has. Thus the person attacked
by the blameless children would be entitled to defend
himself against their aggression on the grounds that he
had a moral right to do so, not on the grounds that he
would thereby increase social welfare.
But turning to a rights-based approach will not help
with the above difficulty. For we still confront the problem
of conflicting justifications we saw with the plank case. If
A has a moral right to push B off the plank, B must have a
symmetrical moral right to do the same to A. But if A is
justified in pushing B off, B may not rightfully oppose him.
Surely if B tries to push A off the plank, he is opposing A in
his efforts to push B off. The same might be said for self
defense. If the victim has a right to kill the child-attackers
with a hand grenade, then surely the children must also
have a right to defend themselves by, let us imagine, using
a shield to lob the hand grenade back to the victim. But if
this is so, then the victim's moral right to defend himself
cannot provide the basis for a legal right of justification,
since if the victim is justified in throwing the grenade, the
children cannot be justified in using a shield to lob it back. 34
So turning from a social welfare to a rights-based approach

34. The situation is actually more complicated than this, since on many
accounts of the nature of moral rights, the victim could not have a moral right
that could be rightfully opposed either. For a discussion of such cases and the
difficulties that surround them, see Claire Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the
State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to ita Citizens, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361
(1999).
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to justification does not seem to make it easier to fit these
cases into a justification framework.
Now consider the two cases the choice theory would
traditionally place under the heading "excuse."
The
classification there is equally problematic. For examplet in
order to make duress cases consistent with the choice
theozys approach to excuses, the theory must maintain
that a defendant who acts under duress has lost control
over his conduct. But what reason is there to suppose that
this is the case? The person who decides to rob a bank
under threat that his loved ones will be killed if he does not
is not less in control of his conduct than the man who
pushes the other person off the plank, or the person who
attacks a mob of child assailants in self-defense. All three
defendants act on the basis of reasons1 and the reasons, in
both cases, are roughly the same: the agents wish to protect
themselves or the lives of those they love. It is often said
that the dP.fendant in a duress situation loses control
because of the pressure of the situation in which he finds
himself.
But surely a person who is on the verge of
drowning or a person who is about to be killed by a mob of
children would be under at least as much psychological
pressure.
The same difficulty arises with the choice theozys
approach to a person who violates the law under pressure
from a law enforcement officer. What reason is there to
believe that the defendant in such cases is not in control of
his actions or that his conduct has somehow become
involuntary? As Robinson himself admits, the entrapment
defense cannot be consistently formulated in terms of lack
of capacity, since if the person entrapped trul y lacks the
ability to conform his conduct to the law, the defendant
who is induced by non-government agents to violate the law
should also have a defense.35

35. Robinson so mewhat equivocally concludes that the entrapment defense
"probably reflects a combination of concerns including an estoppel notion that it is
unfair to permit the entity that has entrapped to then punish." 2 Robinson, supra
note 16, § 2.09 (b), at 516.
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The partial defense of provocation comes closer to
fitting the capacity model, since such cases at least involve
an altered psychological condition.
But it is not quite
accurate to think of emotional upset as a loss in a person's
capacity to control his conduct. To see this, notice that if a
person who encounters his daughter's rapist at a social
gathering is excused because he lacks the ability to conform
his conduct to the law, then someone who encounters his
daughter's ex�fianc� should also have a partial defense if
his anger over the broken engagement is what led him to
attack the victim. Or if the person who finds his wife in
bed with another man receives a defense for killing her
and/or her paramour because he is unable to control his
rage, then the person who finds his ex girlfriend in bed
with her husband in their own home should also have a
partial defense, assuming he too kills out of jealousy. Yet
the law does not hand out partial defenses to people who
kill simply because they lose their tempers. And that
suggests that lack of capacity is not the reason we
exonerate in such cases. Instead, the law offers a defense
in situations in which any reasonable person would have
done the same. The defense is thus at least partially based
on a normative stance we take towards people's emotional
reactions, and not primarily on a judgment that they are no
longer responsible agents.
If fully responsible defendants who choose to violate
the law are to be afforded a defense, it must be because the
law endorses the content of the reasons on which they act.
But it is not clear in any of these cases why the law would
endorse the agent's reason tbr acting, since there is no
reason for the law to favor the illegal act over the legal :rule
it contravenes. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the
defendant's behavior is endorsed on a rights-based theory
of justification, since these are cases in which it is
problematic to think of any moral right the defendant
might have as giving rise to a legal right to violate the law.
In the face of these difficulties, the choice theory retreats
from the traditional claims about social utility to a
psychological claim about diminished capacity. But there
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is no basis for thinking of most of the above defendants as
lacking in capacity either. In particular, the defendants
who would have "excuses" on this view are typically as
much in control of their conduct as the defendants who
would no�ally have "justifications." There is thus reason
to think that the explanation for defenses of the above sort
has eluded the traditional theorists, and that some
rethinking of the grounds for such defenses is in order.
I have set forth the difficulties with the choice theory's
approach to the rational excuses in greater detail
elsewhere.38 I shall not, therefore, elaborate on that theory
further here. Let us then turn to the character theory
instead.

IV. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND THE CHARACTER THEORY
The character theory holds out hope of a better account
of the rational excuses, insofar as it is sensitive to the
underlying dispositions from which criminal acts can arise.
Most helpfully, the character theory has no need to treat
the excuses in terms of diminished capacity, since it allows
that we can excuse conduct performed by responsible
It thus contemplates a normative basis for
agents.
excusing defendants under certain circumstances. This is
attractive, first, because it provides a less distorting
account of some of the defenses with which we are
concerned, and second, because it holds out the hope of
accounting for the defenses we are calling rational excuses
in a unified way.
Perhaps the most compelling case that the character
theory can explain the rational excuses can be made with
respect to the defense of entrapment. There courts are
explicit, under at least one line of cases, that the defendant
merits a defense when pressured by law enforcement
agents into breaking the law, unless the prosecution can
36. Finkelstein, Duress, supra note 10. I did not label the view I was
But insofar as my criticisms were directed

criticizing as such in that article.

towards the traditional approach to the excuses, the choice theory was my
implicit target.
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show that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the
legal violation anyway.
The cases suggest that if a
defendant possessed the relevant disposition, the fact that
a law enforcement officer pressured him into committing a
crime should not provide a defense. A defendant will thus
be entitled to a defense if his character is good, meaning
that he is not normally disposed to violate the law, and he
will lack a defense if his character is bad, meaning that he
is inclined to violate the law. Arguably, this same analysis
can be extended to cases of duress, as well as to some self
defense and personal necessity cases. While the case law
does not explicitly bear out the emphasis on character in
the way that the entrapment cases do, the character
theorist might nevertheless maintain that the reason we
extend these defenses where we do is that they apply to
situations in which we cannot infer anything negative
about the character of the defendant who violates the law,
despite the fact that a criminal violation would normally
allow us to draw that inference.
Despite its superficial appeal, the character theory
turns out to possess a series of flaws that make it
ultimately unable to provide an account of criminal
responsibility generally, and of the rational excuses in
particular. I shall begin by considering several objections
to the character theory of a general sort, and then move on
to its specific shortcomings with respect to the rational
excuses.
First, the law simply does not seem terribly interested
in character when it makes determinations of guilt and
innocence, or even when it determines the appropriate

sentence for

a

person found guilty. In particular, having a

bad character is neither necessary nor sufficient for
justified punishment. It is not necessary, because a person
with a good character can commit a terrible crime, and
while the evidence of his good character may serve to
influence his sentence within a certain limited range, the
effect of a good character on the sentence of a person who
has committed a very serious infraction is marginal. It is
not sufficient, because no matter how bad a person's
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character, he cannot be punished unless he has violated
one of the criminal law's prohibitory norms. People who
are chronically ungenerous, or who regularly deceive others
about small matters in order to better themselves, probably
have bad characters , or at least bad character traits. But
we do not normally think they deserve to suffer
punishment for such traits. The motivational version of
the character theory is subject to the same criticism: it is
neither necessary nor sufficient that a person have a bad
motive to warrant criminal punishment.
It is not
necessary, because the person who holds up a liquor store
cannot defend himself by pointing out that he intended to
give the money to the March of Dimes. And it is not
sufficient, because people may do all sorts of things with
the hope of harming their fellows that the law does not
attempt to prohibit. The problem, fro� the character and
motivation theorists' perspective, then, is that neither is
able to offer a clear principle that accurately distinguishes
those immoral or ill-motivated deeds that are criminalized
from those that are not.87 Whatever principle the character
theorist might present, he surely cannot avoid the
conclusion that we do not criminalize bad character per se.
Second is an evidentiary point: Character theorists
depend on the claim that where the excuses do not apply,
we can infer something about the character of a person
from the criminal act he performs. But there seems no
reason to suppose this is correct. In some contexts, the fact
that a person was willing to violate the law says something
good about his character-it might suggest, for example,
that he is so driven by his moral convictions that he is
willing to expose himself to a risk of punishment in order to
defend them. This is surely the case when the defendant
takes himself to be violating an unjust law or when he is
pursuing charitable ends. Robin Hood provides the most
famous example, but there is also the savvy detective, the
street-wise cop, or the activist lawyer, all of whom play a
37. See Leo Katz's contribution to the present volume for m any more
examples of immoral agents, most of whom could be said to have bad characters,
but whom we would not want to punish.
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bit fast and loose with rules of police conduct or rules of
evidence in their pursuit of the bad guy. Typically the laws
they violate seem formalistic and unimportant, and the
motive from which they act pure and noble. Thus the fact
that the defendant commits a criminal act simply does not
supply reliable evidence about the merits of his underlying
character. The same is true when we try to infer motive,
instead of character, from the performance of an illegal act.
Not only will the law refuse to exonerate the compassionate
and well-motivated mercy killer, but it will even treat him
offense as a more serious one than that of the jealous lover
who kills in the heat of passion .38 Yet we surely do not
think that a wife who helps her beloved husband end his
suffering from a terminal disease necessarily acts on a
worse motive than the person who kills his wife's paramour
when he discovers the couple in flagrante delicto. We must
conclude that bad motive, like bad character, is simply not
a good correlate for criminal liability.
The most important difficulty with the character
theory for our purposes, however, is the account it offers of
action performed on the basis of a disposition or character
trait. For the account of dispositions it offers makes it
unsuitable for explaining defenses predicated on that
notion. The problem stems from the fact that character
theorists overlook a central psychological fact about
character traits, namely that they produce actions semi·
automatically. Once the nature of such actions is fully
understood, it should be clear that it is not possible to use
character in the way the character theorist proposes. The
problem is that the semi-automatic nature of actions
expressing a disposit!on ma.ltes them f..mction like an
intervening condition between the agent's formation of his
character and the action that later results from that
character trait.
For this reason, responsibility for
character does not translate into responsibility for the acts
that follow from those traits.
.

38.

See Model Penal Code § 210.2 & § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Let us focus on the notion of a disposition, rather than
on the narrower notion of a character trait. Dispositions
are simply entrenched patterns of behavior; they need not
be morally valenced. The salient feature of dispositions,
which traits of character share, is that they are at least
partly habitual, and require less involvement from the
agent's rational faculties than ordinary willed action. Once
a person has acquired a generous disposition, for example,
the decision of whether to give to others is no longer
entirely a matter of choice. Indeed it is this feature that
makes it helpful to acquire dispositions in the first place.
Because acts that stem from a disposition require less of an
effort of will than those that are sui generis, having a
disposition makes actions of the relevant sort easier to
perform.
Thus the generous person finds it easier to
perform acts of generosity than the stingy person, because
she has g standing set of responses in circumstances calling
for generous acts. Instead of deliberating about what to do
when an opportunity for generosity arises, she may often
simply find herself performing such acts when the situation
calls for them. And this is because �he takes performing
generous acts in certain circumstances as a non-optional
end towards which she strives. Her practical reflections
consist entirely in trying to figure out how to perform the
generous act, not in whether to perform it.39 We often
capture this by saying that doing · the generous thing
"comes naturally" to such a person, by which we mean that
the person does it with little reflection or internal debate.
It is important, however, not to obscure the fact that
a ctions that stem from a disposition are still fully
intentional, and thus ultimately remain up to the agent.
An experienced driver, for example, may shift gears largely
39. Aristotle says something similar about the notion of character. He says,
"that which is in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man," and
also, famously, that "We deliberate not about ends, but about means." Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle 971, 970 {Richard McKeon
ed., W.O. Ross trans., Random House 1941). Together, these passages suggest
that the virtuous man simply takes objects of virtue as his end, without
deliberating about them. His deliberation is only about how to realize the
virtuous ends he takes as given.
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without reflection. The absence of deliberation does not
negate the driver's control over his bodily movements. His
control lies in the fact that the driver remains capable of
rejecting his habitual movements in favor, say, of shifting
gears at an unaccustomed moment or in an unusual
pattern or manner. The point of acquiring the habit is not
literally to make it impossible for the driver to do anything
other than perform his habitual bodily movements, but to
make it substantially more difficult for him to do so. This
is why the driver can rely on his ability to perform the right
actions at the right time: The fact that the movements
required for shifting gears have become habitual makes it
easy for the driver to execute them.40
Like the experienced driver, the actions of the person
with a disposition display the following combination of
features: First, we are assuming that the agent is
responsible for the acquisition of her own disposition.41
Second, the actions to which the relevant dispositions give
rise are fully voluntary and intentional. Yet, third, the
actions displaying the disposition are executed largely
without the agent's rational deliberation.
Just as the
driver would have to struggle to force himself to adopt an
unaccustomed pattern of shifting, so it would take an effort
of will for the generous person not to respond with
generosity. It is for this reason, I am suggesting, that
actions that proceed from a disposition are less under the
rational control of the agent who performs them. While
they are still fundamentally up to the agent, an individual
will have to fight his own dispositions to act other than the
40. For a discussion oi expert behavior, see Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E.
Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the
Era of the Computer (1986).

41. The assumption actually may be a questionable one. In particular, i t
appears to stand i n some conflict with the law's assumption that th e fact that a

defendant had a rotten social background should entitle him to at least partial
mitigation of his sentence. For if the law supposes that a defendant desenres to
be exonerated for a bad act he performed on the grounds that his background
shaped him in a way that made him violate the law, then the law seems to be

assuming that human beings are not responsible for their characters after all. In
what follows I shall assume the Aristotelian thesis throughout nonetheless, since
debating this point will take us too far afield.
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disposition would indicate. Alternatively, if the disposition
is very well established and very controlling, the agent may
actually have to alter the disposition before he can alter the
course of action he would otherwise perform. Thus while
agents acting under the weight of a disposition control the
actions they perform, the control they exert is indirect:
control over the action operates through control over the
acquisition and maintenance of the disposition from which
the action issues.
But if the person who acts on a disposition is still capable
of acting against the weight of his disposition, why would the
fact that an act stems from a disposition provide a basis for
exonerating an agent who perfonns it?
To see why
dispositions might diminish an agent's culpability for a bad
act he perfonns, consider the behavior of a drug addict trying
to satisfy his pangs of addiction. On the one hand, in most
cases the addict is fully responsible for his addiction, in
roughly the same way that Aristotle posited for virtuous and
vicious actions: The agent gave himself the disposition by
repeatedly performing acts of the sort the disposition
involves. The addict's bodily movements remain under his
control, even when he is most fully in the grip of his addiction.
Evidence for this lies in the fact that he will surely be capable
of instrumental reasoning about each act he perfonns. He
may deliberate rather carefully about where and how to
administer the drug to himself, and he may even have the
capacity to adopt relatively long-term plans in pursuit of his
end. But despite the fact that he controlled the onset of the
addiction in the first place, and the fact that he performs the
actions intentionally that manifest the addiction, it is no
longer up to t.'l).e addict whether or not to take the drugs.
There is thus a sense in which the addiction vitiates the
addict's ultimate responsibility: Although he is responsible for
becoming an addict in the first place, that responsibility does
not transfer to particular acts performed in satisfaction of
that addiction, even acts that are properly speaking
intentional. For, like the generous person we considered
above, taking the drug has become a non-optional end in
pursuit of which he must act.
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I have been arguing, against the character theorist,
that even if we grant that agents are responsible for their
dispositions or characters, they are not necessarily morally
responsible for the acts that follow from those dispositions.
This is so, despite the fact that the actions that follow from
the disposition are intentional actions, and thus are at
least indirectly subject to an agent's control. There is,
however, an odd consequence of my argument. On the line
I am suggesting, the generous person is not particularly
praiseworthy for acts of generosity, and the miser is not
terribly criticizable for acts of stinginess. While each may
be praiseworthy or blameworthy for being the sorts of
people they are, neither can be praised or blamed for acting
as they do, given that their actions follow from deeply
ingrained dispositions. Since the generous person cannot
particularly help doing the generous thing, he is merely
acting as he must in giving to others. By contrast, if the
miser were to be as generous as the generous person, he
would be much praised for his act, since acts of generosity
would be particularly impressive coming from him, given
how difficult it is for him to perform them.
I believe, nevertheless, that this is a defensible upshot
of the view of dispositions I have been articulating. It is
consistent with a Kantian perspective on the moral worth
of human action.
Recall Kant's remarks about the
shopkeeper who returns the correct change to his clients.42
Kant says that if the shopkeeper does this because he is a
person of sympathetic temperament, his action has no
moral worth. It is only when he does it against the weight
of present inclination that his action has moral worth,
because only then can we be sure it stems from the will and
is motivated by the thought of duty. Kant thinks that only
actions performed against the weight of an agent's
inclinations can have moral worth, since otherwise an
agent's dutiful acts are motivated by pleasure. Such acts

42. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 65 (H. J. Paton
trans., Harper & Row 1964).
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would not be entirely freely chosen; they would, in Kant's
terms, be "heteronomous," rather than fully "autonomous."
In a similar vein, I am arguing that actions performed
against the weight of an agent's dispositions are most
directly the product of an agent's deliberative faculties, and
so are the actions for which he is most particularly
responsible. While character theorists are intent on seeing
action that stems from standing dispositions as most
emblematic of moral agency, I am suggesting that we have
reason to think of dispositions as standing in opposition to
rational agency, insofar as the action they produce requires
less from the will of the agent than would an action chosen
for its own sake. If this is correct, then it is action that is

out of character for the agent that most bears the stamp of
its author's moral agency, because such action is most
chosen.
The result is problematic for the character
theorist's approach to the excuses. If the character theorist
were correct that we could infer nothing about the
character of the person who participates in a crime at
knife-point, that would tend to inculpate him for the crime,
rather than suggest a reason why he should not be held
responsible. Moreover, if we could draw an inference from
bad act to bad character trait, that would tend to exculpate,
rather than to inculpate. So the character theorist appears
to have matters exactly backwards when he claims that the
reason we give an agent an "excuse" is that the action he
He is, if
performs is not emblematic of his character.
anything, more responsible for action that is out of
character than for action that is in keeping with his
deepest traits.
Having seen that the character theory will not provide
us with a satisfactory approach to criminal responsibility,
let us proceed to consider the nature of the rational excuses
more specifically.
As we shall see, we must deploy
dispositions in quite a different way from the way the
character theorist we have just considered does.
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V. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND ADAPTIVE DISPOSITIONS

The account of the rational excuses I shall develop is
one I presented in preliminary form in two earlier articles,
one dealing with the duress defense and the other with
self-defense.43 In those articles, I argued for a reversal of
the usual appeal to character proposed by the character
theorist: Duress and self-defense, I claimed, do not
exonerate because people who act under these kinds of
pressures behave in ways that are "out of character."
Instead, it is precisely because such acts stem from settled
dispositions in the agent that we are inclined to allow a
I argued that we
defense under these circumstances.
exonerate in such cases because the act the agent performs
in violation of the law stems from standing features of his
motivational set, features we are prepared to endorse.
Duress and self-defense are cases in which we cannot
eliminate the legal violation without eliminating the
disposition from which it arose.
In this Part, I shall
attempt to generalize the arguments I made in the context
of these specific defenses to the wider class of rational
excuses.
On the theory of the excuses I would like to propose,
rational excuses are cases in which the question of the
agent's responsibility for the criminal act refers us to the
larger choice of disposition from which the agent acted. We
can explain defenses like duress, self-defense, entrapment,
and personal necessity along these lines, because such
defenses constitute claims that the disposition that
produced the defendant's wrongdoing is itself socially
beneficial. Thus the reason we afford defendfl._n t.s an excuse
in such cases is that we do not want to discourage
individuals from adopting the relevant dispositions. We
shall see presently why this is the case.
The account I am presenting is largely consistent with
the choice theorist's account. For it accepts the choice
theorist's basic premise that human beings are responsible

43. Finkelstein, supra note 10.
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for conduct in which they choose to engage.
But it
recognizes, first, that a certain category of defenses calls
into play the notion of a disposition, and second, that choice
operates differently where a disposition is at issue than
where it is not. The person who acts on the basis of a
disposition exercises choice, but usually not with respect to
Instead, he must choose between
individual actions.
opposing or reinforcing the disposition, that is, he either
stands in the way of the disposition or continues to allow it
full force. In a case in which a person acts on a bad
disposition, his responsibility for the ensuing bad act is
based on a kind of omission-similar to the choice a person
might make not to oppose another agent who was about to
Of course a person is not
do something terrible.
responsible for all the results of his inaction. He is only
responsible for harmful results that occur through his
inaction if he had a duty to prevent those results. A person
has a duty to prevent the results of his own bad
dispositions where the operation of that disposition will
result in a bad act. Assuming, then, that it is possible,
however difficult, to refrain from acting on a disposition, a
person is responsible for the bad acts he performs that
result from bad dispositions, because he has a duty to
oppose even a semi�automatic process of which he is the
cause and which he controls. But he has no obligation to
stop himself from acting on a good disposition, even when it
produces a bad act, because it is morally commendable that
he has that disposition. In particular, the law grants a
defense in such cases, in recognition of the fact that if the
agent were to stop himself from acting on the disposition
every time it produced a bad act, he would be in danger of
losing the disposition altogether.
The dispositional account of the rational excuses will
diverge from the choice theorist's account in relatively few
places , since the instances in which dispositions play a role
remain relatively few . Disposition is still irrelevant to the
theory of inculpation, and it is irrelevant to defenses other
than the rational excuses. Thus the theory does not extend
to excuses involving involuntary conditions, such as
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epilepsy, or to conditions that impair an agent's rational
faculties, such as infancy, insanity, or involuntary
intoxication. The choice theorist is correct to think of these
as lack of capacity defenses, since a person who has a
tendency to suffer epileptic seizures cannot be said to have
an "epileptic disposition;" nor can a non-rational child be
thought of as having a disposition to act irrationally or non
rationally. Conditions that impair capacity are preclusive
of the exercise of dispositions, since dispositions operate
through, rather than in lieu of, an agent's rational
faculties. The theory also does not affect the analysis of
what we might call "true justifications," namely cases in
which the agent claims a privilege based on the impersonal
benefits he supplies for society at large. For these are
cases in which the defendant's act, considered in and of
itself, is commendable. His defense therefore does not
depend on the merits of the disposition from which he acts.
Thus far my reference to "good" dispositions has been
entirely generic. We must now consider in what sense the
dispositions the rational excuses reflect are "good," as well
as to address the question of why the law might want to
privilege them. My more specific claim is that the rational
excuses involve what I shall call "adaptive" dispositions,
meaning that they are dispositions an agent acquires in
pursuing his own welfare, but which generate collective
gains for members of society as a whole. That is, to the
extent that everyone adopts the dispositions in question,
there will be collective gains that leave each person better
off than he would be in the absence of those dispositions.
My argument is that because there are gains to everyone
from the widespread adoption of these dispositions, we
often tolerate their operation when they lead individuals to
violate the law.
To illustrate, consider the fact that people who acquire
dispositions to keep promises will be able to enter into
cooperative ventures with one another for mutual benefit.
The well-known example of the Humean farmers will make
this clear. Alfred's field is ready for plowing this week, and
Bertram's field will be ready next week. Neither farmer
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can plow his field by himself. Alfred proposes that Bertram
help him plow his field this week, and i n exchange Alfred
will help Bertram next week.
If Alfred can convince
Bertram that he intends to keep his promise to plow
Bertram's field next week, it would be rational for Bertram
to agree to Alfred's proposal, since both will be better off
than if they do not enter into such an agreement. But can
Alfred convince Bertram? In answering this question, we
should assume that there are no further benefits to Alfred
from plowing Bertram's field. That is, Alfred would gain no
reputational advantage by doing so, nor will there be any
future course of dealings between Alfred and Bertram that
would make it advantageous to either to cooperate now. In
addition, we assume there i� no legal or other coercive
enforcement of any agreement the two farmers might
make.
In the absence of reputational incentives or other
external sources of benefit from cooperation, it is hard to
see how it could be to Alfred's benefit to make good on his
promise to help Bertram next week. For once Bertram has
already helped Alfred, there will be no further benefit to
Alfred from keeping his promise. But if this is so, and if
Bertram is rational, and he and Alfred each has knowledge
of the other's rationality, Bertram will not help Alfred. The
result is that both will be left worse off than if they were
able to cooperate.
Suppose, on the other hand, that
Bertram knows that Alfred is a very reliable promise
keeper. and that he keeps promises even when it is not to
his benefit to do so. Then Bertram will be more inclined to
believe Alfred•s promise. and so will cooperate with him. In
cases of this sort, then, there will be mutual gains from the
acquisition of a disposition.
If agents can acquire
dispositions like promise keeping, they will be able to make
use of them to convince one another to enter into otherwise
unenforceable cooperative arrangements that accrue to the
benefit of both. It is for this reason that dispositions to
keep promises and to cooperate with others are "adaptive,"
despite the fact that their operation does not always
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maximize an agent's welfare in the context of the choice the
agent must make.44
Notice that adaptive dispositions function something
like pre-commitment devices. A pre-commitment device is
an external mechanism for ensuring that people keep their
commitments, which works by altering the payoffs to
remove any benefits from violating those commitments. A
disposition accomplishes the same result by way of internal
commitment instead. Unlike an actual pre-commitment
device,
however,
an adaptive disposition
achieves
compliance without exacting a penalty for non-compliance.
An agent who acquires an adaptive disposition has
"internalized" the penalty for non-compliance that external
pre-commitment devices supply. She feels moved to honor
her commitments without the fear of the kind of sanction
an external pre-commitment device would impose. The
disposition works to produce compliance with a social norm
because it acts as a filter on the admissible options from
which an agent who possess the relevant disposition can
choose.45
Moreover, a disposition is in some respects
preferable to a pre-commitment device. In particular, pre
commitment devices have costs that dispositions do not
appear to have. And if individuals can achieve cooperative
behavior in the absence of incurring such costs, there will
be a surplus for the parties to divide that potentially leaves
both parties better off.
To see the costs of pre-commitment devices more
clearly, suppose in order for Alfred to convince Bertram he
intends to make good on his promise to help him plow his
field, Alfred must hire someone to break his kneecaps if he
fails to render the promised assistance. He must pay the
enforcer $50, let us say. At that price, it is still worth it to
Alfred to enter into the agreement with Bertram, since the

44. For an argument that reciprocating in such eases in the absence of pre
commitment strategies, reputations! effects, or other exogenous pay-offs from

cooperation, see David Gauthier, Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A
Critique and a Defense, 31 Noils 1 (1997); David Gauthier, Assure and Threaten,

104 Ethics 690 (1994).
45. Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (1987).
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benefit he will receive from having help with his own field
will more than make up for the cost of the pre-commitment.
But clearly Alfred would be better off if he could convince
Bertram of his sincerity without having to pay the enforcer.
If he had a promise-keeping disposition, he would reap the
benefits of cooperation with Bertram, without having to
pay enforcement costs.
And if acquiring the relevant
adaptive disposition is truly something agents control, then
it would be irrational for someone to proceed by way of pre·
commitment instead.
Thus I am suggesting that we
tolerate violations of our primary norms to make room for
the operation of dispositions because if we did not, it would
be much more costly for us to achieve cooperative behavior.
For we would have to make use of legal norms instead of
informal mechanisms, and such mechanisms would involve
substantial additional enforcement costs.
In the context of the rational excuses, I am suggesting
that dispositions like loyalty to loved ones or strongly self
preferring commitments are adaptive, in · the sense that
there are collective gains from the possession of those
dispositions overall, despite the fact that they sometimes
lead agents to break the law. It might be better if we did
not allow a defense to individuals who are threatened with
death or serious bodily injury, since at the margins that
will result in more coercion, and hence in more crime. And
in many cases, it will result specifically in a greater evil
rather than a lesser one, since a person may have a duress
defense even if the danger with which he is threatened is
not graver than the criminal act he is asked to perform.411
But we could not penalize the legal violation in this case
without also penalizing the possession of the disposition
46. While the defense of duress is generally not allowed as a defense to
murder, many commentators think the restriction makes little sense. See, e.g.,
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law 438 (2d. ed. 1986) ("It is not
proper, on principle, to limit the defense of duress to situations where the
instrument of coercion is a threat of death or serious bodily injury. A threat to do
bodily harm less than serious bodily harm, or a threat to destroy property or
reputation, ought to do . . . "); see also 2 Robinson, supra note 16, § 177(c)(2), at
354 (arguing that the relevant consideration is "the nature of the actor's state of
coercion and his ability to resist it").
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that led to that violation. And since there are cooperative
gains from the underlying adaptive disposition, we do not
wish to discourage the disposition in this way.
But someone might offer the following objection to the
argument I have been making. The fact that there are
mutual gains from allowing agents to develop adaptive
dispositions does not seem to require us to accept the
operation of such dispositions in instances in which the
disposition is not socially advantageous . That is, if we
would truly prefer that a person who possessed adaptive
dispositions followed the primary legal norm, why not use
legal rules to police the line between the instances of, say,
loyalty we want and the instances of loyalty we do not
want? Why must we suffer with the results of loyalty in a
case in which that sentiment leads an agent to violate one
of the law's prohibitory norms, such as the norm against
killing?
The answer is that the operation of the disposition
cannot be policed so precisely. A disposition is an imprecise
mechanism for bringing about socially cooperative
behavior. On the one hand, the costs of trying to enforce
the disposition in non-legal contexts would be much too
high. Consider the "costs, of attempting legally to enforce a
disposition like loyalty in every instance in which we would
like one another to be loyal. Social commitments, marriage
promises, gratuitous exchanges among close friends or
family would all become the subject of legally enforceable
exchanges. Forming dispositions is a preferable way of
binding one another than explicit pre-commitment devices,
since the latter involve costs that achieving cooperative
behavior by way of dispositions would not. On the other
hand, it is also very difficult to suppress the disposition in
those instances in which we would prefer it did not operate.
Thus in order to be able to rely on the correct operation of
the disposition in those instances in which we want them,
we must tolerate their operation in some cases in which we
do not. Where an adaptive disposition conflicts with a legal
prohibitory norm, we sometimes exempt the agent for his
responsibility for having violated the latter.
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In particular, the adaptive dispositions that are of
relevance to explaining the rational excuses are among the
most
fundamental
to
mutually
beneficial
social
arrangements. They are dispositions like self-preservation,
which lead a person to prefer her own life over the lives of
others. Hence we allow a defense of self-defense, even in
cases in which social welfare would be better served if the
defendant could forego the conduct by which he violates the
law, because, for example, more innocent blood would be
shed if the agent acted on the self-preserving disposition
than would be if the agent acted otherwise. In cases like
that of the child attackers, society might be better served if
the defendant chose not to save his life. But a society of
mutual benefit cannot function if individuals do not seek to
preserve themselves and enhance their own well-being.
Personal necessity, such as the case of the men clinging to
the plank, is also a clear example of agents violating a
prohibitory nonn because they are disposed to choose their
own survival over the lives of others . Once again, it is a
disposition we endorse, even though society would
presumably have no objection, and indeed might prefer, if a
person chose to sacrifice himself to save another under the
circumstances. Indeed, the disposition of prudence is so
fundamental to a society founded on principles of mutual
advantage that self-preserving acts may seem to be closer
to justifications than excuses. That would explain why self
defense and necessity have traditionally been considered
justifications rather than excuses, despite the fact that
social welfare is not always directly enhanced when agents
engage in self-preferring acts.

The exception to the overwhelming importance of self
preferring dispositions is when agents are motivated to
protect members of their family or others to whom they
have developed special attachments. Thus the defenses of
duress and provocation are sometimes issued to make room
for other-oriented dispositions, even when they go awry
and lead individuals to kill those they love. Not every case
of duress or provocation takes this form.
In many
instances, the defendant is acting on a self-preferring
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motive, as is the case when the coercion he experiences
threatens him with death or bodily injury if he does not
commit a crime, or when a person is provoked by insults
that incite his self-protective feelings.
But where the
coercion operates by threatening the well-being of a loved
one, or where a person is provoked by feelings of jealously,
the dispositions in question are other-oriented.
Entrapment is similarly a defense in which the
defendant's willingness to violate the law is arguably other
oriented.
But here the disposition operates in an
attenuated sense.
A defendant's susceptibility to the
blandishments of a police officer or other law-enforcement
agent is an understandable result of his being the sort of
person who cooperates readily with others. He is subject to
persuasion because he is a social being, and he wants to be
helpful and cooperative with a person who invites his
assistance or encouragement.
Admittedly, there are
complications here. It is puzzling, for example, that the
defense of entrapment is limited to cases in which the
defendant receives pressure from a governmental agent.
For if the entrapment defense were understood as
accommodating a social disposition in the way I have
described, one might expect similar pressure from a non
governmental official to entitle a defendant to a defense as
welL
It is at least in part for this reason that some
commentators are inclined to see entrapment as a non
exculpatory defense, similar to the diplomatic immunity or
double jeopardy defenses. 47 And it must be admitted that
some applications of the defense seem to fit this model best,
such as cases where the defendant is afforded a defense
because the government has engaged in conduct that is
simply too reprehensible to allow it to prosecute the
defendant for his bad conduct.48
Probably the defense
should be thought of as non-exculpatory in these kinds of
cases. But the heart of the doctrine seems taken up by
cases in which the defense is exculpatory: the reason the
47. See 2 Robinson, supra note 16.

48. I am grateful to Peter Westen for emphasizing the distinction between the

different kinds of entrapment cases.
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defendant merits exoneration in such cases is that the
defendant would not
have violated the law without
pressure from the governmental agent. In such cases, it is
plausible to explain the defense by saying that the
defendant is manifesting a cooperative disposition. And
since the disposition is in evidence in cases in which the
instigating agent is a private citizen, we should probably
extend the defense to such cases.49
A point of clarification before I close this section. It is
common to think of excuse as applying to actions society
would prefer were not performed, actions where we would
ideally wish the agent to abide by the law, but where we
exonerate him for violating it. By arguing that some cases
of self-defense,
some
cases
of necessity,
duress,
entrapment, and other defenses should be conceived of as
"rational excuses," I may appear to be suggesting that we
would prefer the individual attacked by small children to
stay his hand and not to kill them in defense, or for the
starving individual to refrain from stealing the loaf of
bread. I have indeed written thus far as if this were the
case, by saying that the law "tolerates" a violation of its
primary norms in cases in which the violation stems from
an adaptive disposition. But I must now qualify that claim
somewhat. In some cases it is clearly correct that we are
prepared to grant a defense or partial defense, despite the
fact that we would "prefer" that the defendant have
conformed to the prohibitory norm.
This would most
obviously he the case in instances where the provocation
defense might apply.
But it is a much more tenuous
description in self..defense, personal necessity, or duress
cases, where we normally do not think the defendant ought
to sacrifice himself to save the lives of innocent attackers,
to avoid violating a prohibitory norm that does not pertain
to loss of life, or to avoid committing a crime. We do not
necessarily wish that the defendant allow himself or his
49. In this regard, however, the dispositional approach I am proposing here
does not lag behind character theory approaches, since the character theorist
cannot distinguish good character from bad according to the identity of the
entrapping agent.
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loved ones to die in order to avoid assisting in the
commission of a crime. Indeed, we often recognize the
defendant's entitlement to defend his own life or the lives of
others. This is most obviously the case, for example, in
self-defense cases, where we tend to think the defendant is
acting from a claim of right in defending his life, even if he
must threaten the lives of innocent attackers in order to do
so. How, then, is this sense of entitlement compatible with
the argument from rational excuse I have offered?
To say that a defendant should be exonerated on the
basis of a "rational excuse" is not necessarily to say that he
has done something society regards as wrong or
reprehensible, although some instances of rational excuse
It may be that from a moral
fall in this category.
standpoint we are uncertain or ambivalent about the moral
merits of the defendant's conduct.
It is true that the
category of rational excuse does not apply to conduct that
the law wishes to exonerate because it is particularly
commendable. Acts of this sort, such as true lesser evils
cases, belong to the category of justification proper. But
the fact that the conduct is forbidden by law and that it is
not particularly commendable does not mean that it is
reprehensible either.
Thus the category of "rational
excuse" is not restricted to morally opprobrious conduct. It
should also be stressed, however, that there is a common
misconception that may be driving the view of excuse as
applying to morally reprehensible action, and this is the
idea that action we have a moral right to perform is
commendable. Thus in support of seeing self-defense as a
justification, it is sometimes said that surely people have a
right to defend themselves, even against innocent
attackers, and then to add that it is a good thing when
people stand on such a right. While people may have a
moral right to defend their lives, it hardly follows that it is
always a good thing that they exercise this right. Some
rights are morally indifferent, and some can be positively
loathsome when exercised. Thus the fact that the legal
right of self�defense may be supported by a moral right of
self-defense does not seem to me to count in favor of
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treating the legal right as a justification . And, on the other
hand, to treat conduct in self-defense as excused does not
tend to suggest that it is bad or morally reprehensible.
I have argued that the defenses I have called "rational
excuses" are best understood as instances where the law
exonerates because the defendant's choice to violate the law
reflects a disposition the law wishes to endorse. Strong
prudential or other-regarding motivations sometimes lead
an agent to violate the primary norms of conduct, and
where this is the case, we do not hold the agent to the same
standards we would absent such motivation. We must now
consider the justification for constructing our rules of legal
defense according to the dictates of rational self-interest,
and so instituting rational excuses as exceptions to basic
legal norms. That is, if the primary legal norms establish a
standard of conduct below which we do not want
individuals to fall, then why should we exempt individuals
from those rules to make room for adaptive dispositions,
absent a justification for the exempt conduct?
I shall
address this and other issues in the concluding section
below.

VI. CONCLUSION: A CONTRACTARIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE RATIONAL EXCUSES
If the possession of the foregoing dispositions is of
benefit to each individual, we have a basis for thinking of
the exoneration in cases in which a rational excuse applies
as justifiable: Given that it is not possible to ensure that
people act cooperatively in the absence of strong
cooperative dispositions, there are reasons of mutual
advantage for excusing an agent who acts on the basis of an
adaptive disposition in cases in which doing so leads her to
violate the law. Rational agents may not have reason
collectively to prefer the particular illegal action that issues
from an adaptive disposition in a given case, but they have
reason to prefer that others possess such dispositions.
Rational agents inventing rules governing the operation of
the excuses would choose to exonerate others who act on
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such dispositions, since such rules would leave each person
individually better off than he would be in the absence of
such rules. And if this is the case, then rules of this sort
would be readily agreed to by members of society selecting
the legal rules by which they wish to be governed. The
rules governing rational excuses are thus fair and
justifiable, because they represent the choices rational
agents attempting to enhance their own well-being would
make for themselves in an ex ante position of agreement.
Consider once again the example of duress.
As I
suggested above, it may well be better for society as a
whole if legal rules insisted that innocent individuals not
participate in the criminal activities of those by whom they
are coerced. This is probably even true where requiring an
innocent agent to resist the demand to participate in
criminal
activity
would
have
serious
personal
consequences. One reason to prefer sticking to the primary
legal rule over the personal exemption is obvious: potential
coercers would have less chance of successfully coercing
others if the potential victims knew there would be no
criminal defense for their behavior. Thus adherence to the
legal rule may appear to be optimal here. Yet I have
argued that rational individuals would agree to exempt
victims of coercion from their responsibility for the criminal
act in this sort of case. Why? I have argued that the non
legal benefits of adaptive dispositions give agents reason to
prefer a society in which such dispositions are given wide
deference to one in which they are severely restricted.
Thus even if there are good reasons for sticking with the
primary legal nonnsf rational agents may .regard
themselves as better off under a regime that carves out
various exceptions to those norms. This may even be true
if sticking to the norms would actually be better, from the
standpoint of social utility, to allowing the exceptions, even
taking the benefits of the dispositions into account. For the
fact that a rule would maximize social welfare does not
mean that each individual who must live under that rule
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has reason to think his own welfare maximized by
accepting its terms. 50
There is, however, a fmal wrinkle we should briefly
explore. Earlier we made the argument that dispositions
are preferable to legal enforcement, because there is a cost
s avings from avoiding the costs of pre-commitment. But
arguably dispositions involve costs of their own. And if so,
then the argument we saw about the superiority of
dispositions over pre-commitment devices seems to apply to
non-dispositional over dispositional decisionmaking: While
a disposition allows agents to reap the benefits of
cooperation with other agents, it would be better if human
beings
simply
committed themselves
to
behaving
cooperatively.
So if dispositions are preferable to pre
commitment devices because they accomplish the same
ends without the costs, then surely rational, case-by-case
commitment is preferable to dispositional commitment, for
the same reason. If so, then the contractarian argument
we have just considered for indulging dispositions is subject
to doubt.
It is admittedly true that dispositions involve costs.
There are costs involved in acquiring the disposition in the
first place. And there are costs of the sort associated with
any practical rule, stemming from the fact that rules are
imperfectly tailored to the situations to which they apply.
Thus the generous person might continue to give even after
his recipient has shown himself to be an undeserving
wretch; the miser might continue to pinch pennies even
after the need to do so has been eliminated by his winning
the lottery. And the person who is deeply loyal to family

50. This last point is an exceptionally complicated one, and I have mostly side

stepped it in the above argument. That is, I have assumed for the most part that
making room for adaptive dispositions as exceptions to primary legal norms
would maximize society's overall welfare, as well as maximize the welfare of
individual agents. But at least theoretically, it is possible that each agent in a
position of antecedent social choice would regard himself as better oft' under a
legal regime that was non-optimal from the standpoint of social welfare. And in
that case, the contractarian justification for legal rules I am suggesting here
would diverge from the utilitarian or welfarist analysis that would support
sticking with the legal rule.
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and friends may commit a crime as a result of such loyalty,
under circumstances in which it would be better if he did
not. Like any practical rule, adaptive dispositions will
sometimes be both over and under-inclusive.51
Thus a society of perfectly rational agents seeking the
benefits of cooperation and coordination would not make
use of adaptive dispositions. Individuals in such a society
would simply cooperate where there were mutual gains
from doing so, and otherwise they would proceed by
enforceable legal prohibitions where those were beneficial
instead.
That is, perfectly rational agents would ask
themselves whether they would be better off under a given
cooperative arrangement than they would be outside that
arrangement. Where the agreement provides a net benefit,
perfectly rational agents would be faithful to their
agreements: they would use internal commitment to
reproduce the effects that less than perfectly rational
agents would achieve through the formation of dispositions.
And where this was the case, the contractarian argument
for the incorporation of the rational excuses into legal rules
For agents would not form
would not go through .
dispositions under these circumstances, and legal rules
would not have to be shaped to accommodate them. But
the human actors for whom the rules of the criminal law
are fashioned are not perfectly rational. They are not
agents who would otherwise be capable of instituting
cooperative ventures in the absence of enforcement or some
reputational or other incentive to cooperate. Cooperative
dispositions, on the other hand, make it possible for agents
to coope.rate in the absence of such external incentives.
Thus the contractarian argument justifying the existence of
the rational excuses we have just considered is compelling
as long as we understand its applicability as limited to
legal societies established by somewhat imperfectly
rational agents.

51. See Frederick Shauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-based Decision-making in Law and Life ( 1991)
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The significance of the account of the adaptive
dispositions I am proposing should now be clear:
Dispositions are strategies agents can adopt in order to
compensate for the fact that they are less than perfectly
rational.
They allow imperfectly rational agents to
approximate the position they would be in if they were
perfectly rational. The law of criminal defenses takes that
imperfection into account, allowing basically rational
agents to compensate for their own irrationality by forming
dispositions.
Such dispositions are "adaptive," because
they allow human beings to act in ways that ultimately
increase their own well-being and those of their fellows.
The criminal law accommodates and encourages the
formation of such dispositions by exonerating or partially
excusing agents who act on the basis of them.

